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Abstract: This study aims to address the relative lack of research examining the Canadian
experience of terrorism relating to the ‘Global Salafi Jihad’. The fundamental research
question was ‘What have people living in, or from, Canada been doing to support or advance
violent jihad either at home or abroad?’ Data were collected on individuals active from the
1980s through to the end of 2011 in an effort to be as exhaustive as possible. They were
analysed according to three broad categories: Background variables; Operational variables;
and Investigations and Outcomes. The sample was further divided into two and results
compared according to whether individuals began offending before or after September 11th
2001, in order to assess change over time. The paper begins with a brief history of terrorism
in Canada, followed by the methodology, analysis of variables, and summary and
conclusions. Cases included and excluded from the analysis are listed in Appendices A and B
respectively.
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A Brief History of Canadian Terrorism
Canada has, on the whole, been fortunate in its experience of terrorism. During the 1960s
through to the early 1970s there were overlapping waves of terrorism primarily perpetrated
by two distinct movements.1 The first was the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors, who were part
of a Russian religious sect that had settled in British Columbia at the beginning of the 20th
century.2 Their beliefs brought them into conflict with organised society and they protested
by way of public nudity, arson and bombings, peaking in the early 1960s.3 The second group
was the far more well-known Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) thought to be responsible
for the majority of Quebecois separatist violence, which peaked from about 1968 to 1971.4
FLQ violence declined following the ‘October Crisis’ of 1970 when Prime Minister Pierre
Trudeau implemented the War Measures Act in response to the kidnapping of British Trade
Commissioner James Cross and Quebec’s Labour Minister Pierre Laporte (who was
subsequently murdered).5 Following the military-led round-up of suspected militants, the
loss of popular support combined with improved political opportunities hastened the group’s
demise.6
According to Ross’s calculations, from 1960-1985 the Sons of Freedom and the FLQ
were responsible for 296 acts of terrorism on Canadian soil (although some estimates are
much higher7), with close to 200 additional incidents attributable to a variety of other groups
and individuals.8 Within those 25 years, just 10 people (including 2 terrorists) were killed as a
result of terrorist violence in Canada. The Global Terrorism Database reports just 39 acts of
terrorism in Canada for the period 1986-2010, including just 3 domestic fatalities (none of
which are assigned to known groups).9
Figures on domestic attacks, however, reveal little of Canada’s involvement in
terrorism. It has been used to plan, support and even launch attacks against foreign interests,
most notably the bombing of Air India Flight 182 by Sikh separatists, which exploded enroute from Montreal to London on June 23rd 1985, killing 329 people.10 Canada has also been
used extensively as a base of operations for fundraising and support activities by a wide
variety of international terrorist organizations on an ongoing basis. “By 1998, every major
terrorist group in the world was operating in Canada” and there were few legal measures in
place to prevent it before December 2001.11

The Evolving Islamist Terror Threat
Islamist militants have also taken advantage of Canada since at least the 1980s. Individuals
have been linked to a range of terrorist organizations (including Hamas and Hezbollah12),
2
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although the focus here is upon the ‘Global Salafi Jihad’ advanced by al-Qaeda and its
affiliates.13 The most prominent among these early Islamist ‘entrepreneurs’ was Ahmed Said
Khadr who first came to Canada in 1975, was awarded citizenship, and became a fundraiser
for the Afghan mujahideen beginning in the mid-1980s.14 Among his associates were
Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and many other senior al-Qaeda
operatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan.15 He raised thousands of dollars in Canada,
ostensibly for charity, and in December 1995 was arrested in Pakistan on suspicion of having
funded the Egyptian embassy bombing in Islamabad the previous month.16 Although thenPrime Minister Jean Chrétien intervened to secure his release, intelligence continued to
implicate Khadr and in January 2001 he was designated as an al-Qaeda financier by the UN.17
The realisation in hindsight that Chrétien had erred created what is known as the ‘Khadr
effect’- a reluctance among Canadian politicians to intervene on behalf of citizens held
abroad on suspicion of terrorism, should they cause future embarrassment.18 Indeed, Khadr
continued his activities and raised his family in the same environment (three of his sons –all
Canadian citizens- are included in the current database alongside their father). But they
returned to Toronto whenever required and Khadr senior was well known among Canadianbased militants. He was ultimately killed in a shootout with Pakistani soldiers in October
2003 near the Afghan border,19 after which a pro-jihadi website described him as a “founding
member of al-Qaeda”.20
Another well-known early example is Fateh Kamel who came to Canada from Algeria
in the late 1980s and married a Canadian.21 Over the next decade he spent time in
Afghanistan and Bosnia, travelled extensively in support of the mujahideen (working closely
with Sheikh Anwar al-Shabaan of the Islamic Cultural Institute of Milan) and established a
network of jihadi supporters in Montreal.22 Members of the network engaged in organised
theft and dealt in false passports and other fraudulent papers which were used to support the
activities of militants in Europe and elsewhere.23 Kamel was eventually arrested in Jordan in
March/April 1999 and extradited to France where he was convicted for being part of a
criminal-terrorist conspiracy and providing false documents to terrorists behind the 1995
metro bombings and the Roubaix gang armed robberies of 1996.24
More significant still was the arrest of Ahmed Ressam on December 14th 1999 as he
was entering the United States with explosives in the trunk of his car, intending to bomb Los
Angeles airport. After starting out as a thief in the Kamel network Ressam had gone on to
train at militant camps in Afghanistan and had been acting on behalf of the al-Qaeda
leadership.25 His arrest was a watershed moment for Canadian counter-terrorism, stoking
3
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fears in the US that its northern neighbour was lax on security and therefore a potential
threat.26 It simultaneously served as a wake-up call for Canadian authorities who had been
monitoring Islamist militant networks but –as was the case in most Western countries- had
failed to grasp the seriousness of the threat. The result was a lasting and acutely felt need to
avoid making the same mistake again, and, after 9/11, to demonstrate to the US that Canada
was a reliable partner in the ‘War on Terror’27 (termed the ‘Ressam effect’28).
In the ensuing years the Islamist terror networks that had been allowed to develop
during the 1990s were dismantled by way of arrests, deportations and the use of security
certificates to detain suspected terrorists without charge, often on the basis of secret
evidence29 (similar to control orders in the United Kingdom). The Canadian government
strengthened its capacity to combat terrorism by way of enhanced legislation (beginning with
the Anti-Terrorism Act, passed on December 18, 200130) combined with structural reforms31
and budgetary increases for national security, which by 2011 exceeded CAN $92 billion.32
Canadian commandos took part in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and combat troops
officially supported the war-effort beginning in February 2002 (ending in July 2011).33
Predictably, this led to Canada being named as a target for attacks by Osama bin Laden in a
speech broadcast in November 200234, thus redefining Canada’s status among global jihadis.
And although Canada did not directly participate in the war in Iraq,35 this did not earn it
exemption from the ire of Islamist militants- in March 2004 Canadians were rated the fifth
most desirable Western target in an article posted online by jihadists.36
Despite these words Canadians were not singled out for attack in the same way that
some of their allies were, but rather continued to be ‘caught in the cross-fire’ in attacks aimed
at others or at the West in general, such as the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005, the bombing
of the UN headquarters in Baghdad in 2003, the Mumbai attacks in 2008 and the bombing of
the Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta in 2009.37 Canada was targeted most directly
outside of a warzone by a group of British militants arrested in August 2006, who had been
planning to bomb several airplanes using liquid explosives, but even then the Canadian
targets were secondary to American airlines.38
Similarly, Canadian citizens arrested or suspected of involvement in Islamist
terrorism in the early post-9/11 years suggested a continuation, rather than a clear break from
the past in that they continued to focus their activities overseas. Mohammed Mansour
Jabarah, for example, (arrested in Oman in March 2002) had been planning to bomb Western
embassies in South East Asia39; and Mohammad Momin Khawaja (arrested in Ottawa in
March 2004) had been assisting a group of British jihadis planning to attack targets in the
4
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UK.40 It may have been surprising that these men had grown up in Canada, as opposed to
immigrating as established adult militants, but they had not seemingly intended to harm their
countrymen.
The nature of the threat was, however, changing. A Canadian Security Intelligence
Service (CSIS) briefing for the year 2004-2005 reported that “[w]hile the threat remains
concentrated overseas, an attack on Canadian soil is now probable”.41 Little more than a year
later the ‘Toronto 18’ arrests took place, ultimately resulting in eleven convictions –all young
men who had spent most of their lives in Canada- including four convictions for planning
domestic terror attacks.42 One of the group leaders, Zakaria Amara, had constructed a
functioning detonator and two of his followers were arrested as they unloaded 3 tonnes of
what they thought was ammonium nitrate fertilizer in a police sting operation.43 They are
believed to have been targeting the Toronto Stock Exchange, CSIS headquarters and/or a
Canadian military base for bombings intended to force the government to withdraw troops
from Afghanistan.44
Since then there have been three more alleged Islamist terrorism plots aimed purely at
domestic targets (Hiva Mohammad Alizadeh, Misbahuddin Ahmed and Khurram Syed Sher,
arrested in August 2010,45 Matin Abdul Stanikzy, arrested in November the same year; and
John Nuttall and Amanda Karody, arrested in July 2013).46 A fourth plot, uncovered in April
2013, allegedly involved a plan to derail a passenger train travelling from Toronto to New
York.47 These cases, in addition to continuing reports and arrests in relation to Canadians
involved in terrorism overseas have eroded the lingering assumption that Canada is somehow
immune to violent radicalization at home. This realization is supported by findings from
opinion polls of Canadian Muslims, which reveal that although the vast majority report
positive attitudes towards Canada, a significant minority nevertheless express support for
terrorism. For example, one report in 2006 found that 5% of those who were aware of the
Toronto 18 case felt that the attacks would have been completely justified had they gone
ahead, and a further 7% felt they would have been somewhat justified.48 There has also been
concern among security analysts about the potential for ostensibly non-violent groups such as
Hizb-ut Tahrir (which had its inaugural meeting in Canada in a Mississauga community
centre in July 200949) to foster anti-Canadian sentiments.50 Coupled with the fact that the
Canadian Muslim population, currently at 940,000 or 2.8% of the population, is estimated to
triple by 2030,51 there appears to be a growing sense of uncertainty among policymakers
about the potential for further radicalization among subsections of some communities.52
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Within this context CSIS has reported that “religious extremism” is its primary
counter-terrorism concern on the domestic stage,53 a sentiment echoed by Prime Minister
Stephen Harper, who in September 2011 confirmed that Islamist terrorism continued to
present the main threat to Canadian national security.54 This was yet again reiterated with the
unveiling of Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy in February 2012.55 Yet despite this obvious
concern, there has been very little in the way of empirical research to examine Islamist
terrorism in Canada,56 leaving a significant deficit in current understanding of the threat.
Questions remain as to the demographic backgrounds of those involved; how and why they
have radicalized; what precisely Canadians have been doing in support of violent jihad; how
the phenomenon has developed over time; and how the Canadian experience compares to
other Western countries? Based on an exhaustive sample of publicly known cases dating
from the 1980s through to 2011, the present study attempts to answer these questions.

Methodology
The immediate issue in any study of terrorism is how the term is defined. It is well known
that there is not (and likely never will be) a universal definition of terrorism, therefore the
focus of research and the limits of validity and possible generalization are defined by the
research question and sample. The overarching research question here was ‘What have people
living in, or from, Canada been doing to support or advance violent jihad either at home or
abroad?’ The sample is restricted to cases pertaining to the ‘global Salafi jihad’ referring to
the al-Qaeda ‘brand’ of Sunni Islamist terrorism whereby jihad is believed to be necessary
violence against the perceived enemies of Islam.57 Restricting the sample in this way
maintains analytical focus and facilitates comparison to previous studies which have utilised
similar criteria.58
The inclusion -or exclusion- of individuals in this study is not a judgement of guilt or
innocence and has no bearing whatsoever on legal proceedings. It is an objective analysis of
publicly available information intended to improve understanding of a certain type of
behaviour. The terms terrorist, militant and jihadi are used interchangeably to describe the
individuals in the sample based upon their (alleged) behaviour, which included the following
non-mutually exclusive categories: 1) Membership in a terrorist organization, where no other
specific offences could be determined (e.g. Mohamed Harkat); 2) Promoting jihad (e.g.
Salman An-Noor Hossain); 3) Fundraising (Ahmed Said Khadr); 4) Facilitating jihad (e.g.
Faruq Khalil Muhammad ’Isa); 5) Domestic training (members of the Toronto 18 group); 6)
Attempted overseas training and combat (e.g. Mohamed Hassan Hersi); 7) Successful
6
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overseas training with no further offences (e.g. Amr Hamed); 8) Jihadi fighter in foreign
conflicts (e.g. Abdullahi Afrah); and 9) Planning/conducting attacks (e.g. Hiva Mohammad
Alizadeh et al).
Rather than distinguish between ‘home-grown’ and ‘foreign’ militants (which is by no
means a clear-cut affair) individuals were included in the sample regardless of their
nationality or place of birth, as long as their offending (i.e. relevant behaviour) occurred after
they had taken up residence in Canada. There were no restrictions otherwise in terms of when
offences occurred. This is in line with the research goal of conducting as comprehensive an
analysis as possible.
Included individuals (see Appendix A) were classified according to the following
categories, which may be treated with varying degrees of confidence in terms of reliability of
allegations: 1) Confirmed domestic prosecutions (e.g. Said Namouh); 2) Killed in action
(government confirmed/ news reports, e.g. Rudwan Khalil Abubaker); 3) Foreign convictions
(e.g. Mohamed Warsame); 4) Offender confessions (e.g. Abdurahman Khadr); 5) Legal
allegations (domestic/ foreign, e.g. Ferid Ahmed Imam and Maiwand Yar); 6) Extra-judicial
sanctions (domestic/ international, e.g. Mahmoud Jaballah); and 7) Public allegations (e.g.
Abderraouf Jdey).
Individuals excluded (see Appendix B) were those classified as visitors (i.e. did not
live in Canada for a prolonged period or whose time in Canada could not be confirmed as
significant, e.g. Mohamedou Ould Slahi, Nizar bin Muhammad Naser Nawar); those for
whom only previous offending before coming to Canada is alleged or confirmed (e.g. Ahmed
al-Kaysee, Hassan Almrei); non-Sunni militants (e.g. Mohammad Ashraf Siddiqui); those for
whom there was insufficient information (e.g. Aumar Alsorani); any cases where individuals
were explicitly cleared, acquitted or had charges stayed (e.g. Maher Arar); and any
individuals more appropriately included in samples for other countries that the author is
currently working on (e.g. Tahawwur Hussain Rana- included in a sample of US-based
militants).
The total number of individuals considered for inclusion in the sample (prior to any
exclusions) came to 178 individuals, which was then reduced to 64 as per the above criteria.
These 64 individuals represent the most comprehensive sample of Canadian jihadists to date.
However, as is often the case in terrorism research, missing information was a problem. This
is explicitly acknowledged throughout the analysis, and is furthermore reflected in the way
that percentages are reported. Researchers sometimes ignore missing information and express
percentages as a function of the number of cases on which they do have data (%n), rather
7
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than the true total. A problem with this is that it ignores the general likelihood of certain
outcomes and possible bias in the availability of information, thereby potentially distorting
the picture. For example, where level of education is unknown, it is less likely that this will
include completed university qualifications because these are a statistically less likely
outcome anyway, and it is also less likely that this would go unreported if known (since these
sorts of details are of interest to the press). It is therefore more accurate to present
percentages as a function of the true total and to include information on missing data, which
is the practice adopted herein. The reader is encouraged to bear these details in mind when
interpreting the analysis.
The primary sources of data were open source records consisting of news reports,
court records, law enforcement press releases and other published accounts. Detailed
chronological accounts of each case were constructed and data were entered into an Excel
spread-sheet including 45 predetermined variables of interest per person, relating to
background information, operational (behavioural) details and details of the investigation and
outcome. Following the initial database construction, the author conducted field research in
Canada consisting of interviews with relevant and informed individuals who were asked
about specific cases (in relation to missing or uncertain information) and/or about recent
developments relating to Islamist terrorism and counter-terrorism in Canada. Those
interviewed included an undercover operative in the Toronto 18 case, now counter-terrorism
consultant (Mubin Shaikh), two individuals from within the Canadian intelligence
community, an academic researcher (Michael King), two journalists (Michelle Shephard and
Isabel Teotonio), and two individuals involved in counter-radicalization efforts in the Toronto
area (Muhammad Robert Heft of CanBridge Consulting59 and Sayyid Ahmed Amiruddin of
the Al Sunnah Foundation60). Others were approached but declined to participate. The sample
of interviews was small, occurring over just 10 days, and was limited by opportunity, but
nevertheless helped achieve the stated aims.
Once the database was complete the data were analysed according to whether
individuals began offending before or after September 11th 2001, regardless of when they
ceased offending. The rationale for this is that it is more relevant to understand the context
within which individuals began offending, as opposed to when they end, since this is usually
involuntary. And although the 2003 invasion of Iraq has previously been described as a key
turning point in the development of Islamist terrorism in Western countries,61 the 9/11 attacks
were chosen as an equally, if not more significant, point in time.62 This choice makes little
difference in the overall analysis while still allowing an assessment of change and
8
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development. It is, however, also prudent to note that the overall sample of 64 is thus divided
into two: the ‘pre-9/11’ sample (n = 35) and the ‘post 9/11’ sample (n = 29). Percentages are
easily skewed when dealing with such small numbers and therefore any conclusions that we
draw from these data are necessarily tentative. Nevertheless, developments observed in the
Canadian data are broadly in accordance with previous findings from other Western countries
(detailed below), thus lending mutual support to one another.
As a final caveat, it is important to note this study was completed in early 2012. Since
then, as of mid-2013, another ten jihadi terrorism cases (including at least 15 Canadian
residents/citizens) have been reported.63 Although it has not been possible to update the
quantitative analysis to include these cases, they are briefly referred to in text/footnotes where
relevant, and the overall analysis remains largely unaffected.
The following sections present the analysis for background variables (including a
statistical summary, individual classifications, geographic distribution, demographic profiles,
radicalization and ideological classifications), followed by operational variables (including
group characteristics, offence periods, operational roles, international dimensions and
associations, the role of the Internet and stated motivations) and investigative variables
(investigations and legal outcomes). This is followed by the summary and conclusions.
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Analysis Part 1: Statistical Summary and Background Variables
Table 1 summarizes the analysis of background variables of individuals included in the
sample, each of which are discussed below, beginning with the statistical summary.

Table 1. Statistical summary and background variable information of Canadian Islamist
militants beginning their careers before and after 9/11 (1980s-2011).
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Statistical Summary of Canadian Islamist Terrorism Cases

No. of Individuals

Islamist Terrorism in Canada: 1980s-2011
30
25
20
15
10
Individuals began

5

Individuals ended*

0

Year
Figure 1. Numbers of Canadian residents/ citizens involved in Islamist terrorism according to
when they began and ceased offending.
*Note that since it is unknown when/if some individuals have ended their terrorism careers,
the number of individuals ended (55) is less than those who began (64).

Figure 1 shows the frequency of individuals in the sample according to when they began and
ceased to offend. It is noteworthy that although we often have reliable information about
when individuals cease to offend (usually by arrest or death) there is much less reliable
information about when individuals begin to offend, even though this is perhaps of greater
interest. If we focus only on when individuals are arrested, this gives a delayed impression of
when levels of radicalization and terrorist activity are actually peaking, potentially obscuring
analysis of additional factors that might be contributing, and arguably telling us more about
counter-terrorism than terrorists.
The starting points for offending are based on the first known overt behaviour in
support of terrorism (e.g. travelling to Afghanistan). Thus they do not capture earlier
processes of radicalization and almost certainly underestimate offence periods in some cases.
Although not exact, this information nevertheless approximates the beginning of individual
jihadi careers and allows an assessment of levels of offending against wider contextual
factors. The initial peak in the 1990s relates to North African networks, which grew in the
context of intense conflicts in Algeria, Bosnia and Chechnya at a time when the camps in
11
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Afghanistan were thriving. The apparent drop in individuals beginning to offend after the
1990s is at least partially a product of the way that the graph is constructed (i.e. the first two
time-points represent full decades, after which the graph is divided into single years).
However, it is worth noting that very few individuals began their jihadi careers in the years
immediately following 9/11. This may relate to the previous dismantling of jihadi networks
following the arrest of Ahmed Ressam- in other words a removal of human infrastructure that
otherwise might have facilitated swifter mobilisation. It may also reflect the collective
psychological impact that the September 11th attacks had in Canada combined with
restrictions brought about by the ‘War on Terror’64. The fact that there was not another peak
until 2005 (the Toronto 18 case) likely relates to the fact that Canada did not overtly support
the invasion of Iraq (as compared to Australia and the UK where there were peaks in 200465),
combined with gradual disillusionment with the war in Afghanistan.66 Rates of terrorism also
undoubtedly relate to the presence of individual terrorist entrepreneurs or recruiters and the
localised spread of extremist ideology,67 which may appear to occur almost at ‘random’, but
are also tied to much wider global developments.
As shown in Table 1 above there has been an average of 2.2 individuals (or 2 cases/
groups) per year in the pre-9/11 period, compared to 2.6 individuals (1.4 cases) post-9/11, up
to and including 2011. Bearing in mind that there were likely more individuals offending in
the pre-9/11 era that we simply don’t have information about, at face value these figures
reflect a practically identical rate of individuals. They also superficially indicate an apparent
tendency to be part of slightly larger groups (although this also reflects the way that
individuals were grouped into cases- because members of the Kamel network in fact led quite
distinct offending careers they were largely treated as separate cases, but in reality they were
closely associated with one another and could arguably be classed as a single case). This
highlights the fact that figures by themselves can be misleading, and must be combined with
in-depth qualitative understanding of the different individuals and cases.
Finally, it is also important to note that the apparent decline in cases beginning in the
last few years is potentially misleading because if there are in fact such cases (which would
include numerous unnamed individuals believed to have gone to Somalia to fight for alShabaab) their information is unlikely to become public knowledge until they are captured or
killed.
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Individual Classifications
In terms of the classification of individuals, Table 1 reveals that close to 50% of those who
began their jihadi careers before 9/11 (16/35 individuals) were subject to overseas
prosecutions68 (including Egypt, France, Algeria, Tunisia and the US); a further 26% (9
individuals) were subject to extra-judicial sanctions (mostly issued from 2001-2003),
consisting of 4 security certificates, 2 UN sanctions, 2 individuals detained in Guantanamo
and 1 individual deported as a “danger to the public”69; the remainder involved limited
confessions, people killed overseas, legal allegations (all foreign); and public allegations.
Nobody was prosecuted in Canada. Among those who began offending after 9/11 the picture
is very different. Almost half (13 individuals) have been successfully prosecuted in Canada;
another 31% are currently facing legal allegations (all but 1 in Canadian courts); and the rest
are made up of a handful of public allegations, overseas fatalities and offender admissions.
None of the post-9/11 starters have been subject to extra-judicial sanctions. Overall, these
results quite clearly demonstrate a more proactive and effective counter-terrorism apparatus
in Canada over the past decade.

13
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Geographic Distribution of Cases

Figure 2. Geographical distribution of Canadian residents/ citizens involved in Islamist
terrorism (1980s-2011).. Numbers indicate individuals who began offending before and after
9/11.

Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of individuals in the sample. The sets
se of numbers
indicate the number of individuals in each city/ town according to whether they began their
jihadi careers before or after 9/11.
9/11 The totals are artificially increased due to individual
mobility, meaning some individuals are counted more than once (true sample total = 35n pre9/11: 29n post-9/11). There are two main findings of note. First, Islamist militants in Canada
are primarily located in major urban areas, and in particular in Montreal (34
(34% of the overall
sample) and the Greater Toronto Area
A (47%).
%). This also reflects the distribution of the
Canadian Muslim population (located primarily in Quebec (21%) and Ontario (60%))70
which should not be surprising as it is from within this much larger population that jihadis
emerge. The second finding of interest is that there has been a geographical shift in the
distribution of cases over time. Montreal has become less significant with the dismantling of
the Kamel network, while Toronto has comparatively increased in significance.71 At the same
14
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time more-or-less isolated cases have occurred in a more diverse range of locations
(Edmonton, Winnipeg, Pembroke and Maskinongé72) while in other locations cases have not
reoccurred over time (Leduc, Hamilton, St Catharines and Chicoutimi).
These findings are significant for understanding the social transmission of terrorism,
since they demonstrate that cases can occur in new locations and will not inevitably reoccur
in the same places over time (i.e. jihadi networks can be dismantled with seemingly lasting
effects). However, the continued significance of Toronto (and in particular the Scarborough
area) over time, suggests that lasting pro-jihadi subcultures can develop, creating enduring
‘hotspots’ which cannot be extinguished by arrests alone. As described below, there have also
been changes in the ethnic profile of individuals involved in terrorism in Canada which
correspond to global developments and to the respective populations of Montreal and
Toronto. Specifically, while North Africa used to be a more prominent global hotspot in the
1990s (and North Africans make up the larger proportion of Muslims in Quebec73), Pakistan
and Somalia have become globally more significant since 9/11, and these ethnicities make up
larger percentages of Muslims in Ontario.74

Demographic Profiles
Table 1 confirms that the entire sample, both before and after 9/11, is made up of young
males. The average age range (corresponding to the start and end of offence periods) was
28.6-32.9 in the pre-9/11 period, compared to 23.6-24.5 in the post-9/11 period. These ages
are in the same average range (i.e. twenties to early thirties) as found in global,75 European,76
Australian,77 and British and American78 samples of Islamist militants. They are consistent
with shorter offence periods (see below) and they also confirm, as other studies have, that
there has been a decrease in average age over time.79 This is likely the product of a
combination of factors, including wider exposure to jihadi ideology (in particular by way of
the Internet, which has become ubiquitous in the lives of young people), missing information
about when some of the earlier individuals began their careers (overestimating these ages),
and the fact that Islamist militants are far more likely to be detected and apprehended more
quickly now than in the past.
The fact that the sample is dominated by males is also not surprising, although we
might have expected to find at least some females involved in terrorism in Canada since this
has occurred in other Western countries, particularly in the post-9/11 period (e.g. Colleen
LaRose in the US, Roshanara Choudhary in the UK). There are, however, signs that Canadian
females are getting involved in Islamist terrorism also, despite their absence from the current
15
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sample. A peripheral example comes from the Toronto 18 case, where Fahim Ahmad’s sisterin-law reportedly fuelled discussions on the merits of jihad with Ahmad and a now convicted
British terrorist, Aabid Khan.80 In mid-2011, it was reported that two unnamed females (one
later identified as Asli Nur) from within Toronto’s Somali community are believed to have
gone to Somalia to join with al-Shabaab81 (excluded from the sample pending more reliable
information). Similarly, a mid-2012 report suggests that one Fadumo Jama, aka ‘Mama
Shabaab’, from Toronto, had been running an al-Shabaab safe-house south of Mogadishu for
at least four years.82 More recently still, Amanda Karody became the first female to be
charged with planning a jihadist-inspired, domestic terrorist attack. Based on this, and taking
into account the experience of other Western countries, it is reasonable to expect confirmed
cases of female participation in Islamist terrorist activity in Canada in the future.
Residency and nationality are further demographic variables of interest. For those
who began offending prior to 9/11, 29% of individuals (10 people) entered the country by
illegal means (false passports) but 71% acquired permanent residency rights (including being
granted asylum) or full citizenship. In the post 9/11 sample there have been no confirmed
cases of illegal entry and everyone in the sample had permanent residency or full citizenship.
Somewhat surprisingly, the increase in number of individuals born in Canada over time is not
as large as might have been expected (1 individual (3%) pre-9/11 versus 5 individuals (17%)
post-9/11). Similar studies of Islamist militants in the US, Australia and the UK indicate that
these percentages are much higher in these countries (46%, 57% and 64% respectively83).
The situation in Canada might partially be a reflection of a relatively young, still growing
immigrant population but it is unclear if this is much different to the US and Australia. This
raises the question of whether there is something unique about growing up in Canada that
might serve as a ‘protective’ influence. However, it is also important to recognise that many
of those not born in Canada nevertheless grew up there. In other words, as in other Western
countries, Islamist terrorism in Canada is indeed ‘home-grown’ in the sense that individuals
are radicalizing and turning to terrorism there, as opposed to coming to the country for that
purpose. In terms of nationality, pre-9/11 offenders were more often North African (31%
Algerian, 23% Egyptian, 9% Moroccan) while more in the post-9/11 era have been Canadian
(17%), Pakistani (17%) or Somali (14%). It was mentioned above that these changes
correspond to changes in the global jihadi context, but it is worth elaborating that –as the
percentages show, and as is the case more generally- ethnicity has become a more diverse
affair among Canadian militants over time. This of course means that ethnic profiling is
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unlikely to be a productive investigative technique, although this does not preclude
geographical profiling of ‘hotspots’.
Given that most pre-9/11 offenders came to Canada from foreign countries and were
not subject to the same levels of scrutiny as individuals are today, there is often less available
information about their backgrounds, including education. This was available for only 40% of
the pre-9/11 sample (13 individuals) compared to 79% (23 individuals) post-9/11. With this
in mind, at least 20% of the earlier offenders had completed high school and at least 17% had
completed university, compared to 52% and 24% respectively since then. Whilst at first
glance this may appear considerably lower than some studies have found,84 this is at least
partly due to differences in the way that figures are reported (i.e. whether they are expressed
as a percentage of the number for whom there is information, or the total sample). Where the
same method of reporting is used, based on similar sampling techniques, focusing on the US,
UK and Australia, the results are more directly comparable.85 Regardless of these
comparisons, it is clear that Islamist terrorists in Canada generally have at least basic
education, and a significant minority go on to complete degrees at university. This seems to
contradict the notion that individuals become involved in terrorism because of lacking
education.
Looking at occupations, information was available for 57% (20 individuals) and 79%
(23 individuals) of the respective samples. Although not explicitly shown in Table 1, among
pre-9/11 starters the largest proportion (20%, or 7 individuals) were in semi-skilled
occupations such as truck-driver or shop-keeper. This was followed by skilled occupations
(such as computer technician or school principle) and students. In the post-9/11 period more
individuals were students or unemployed, and more were in unskilled occupations (such as
security guard or fast-food worker). The same numbers of individuals across time periods
were found in high school (2) and in skilled employment (4). These results indicate that there
is a consistent minority of high achievers among Canadian jihadis, albeit within the context
of an overall slight reduction in socio-economic standing. This is likely related to changes in
age (see above) and, bearing in mind differences in reporting, is generally consistent with
findings from previous studies.86
Another area showing some evidence of change is in the religious background of
individuals. 100% of the sample were Muslims, but there have been more converts involved
over time (1 person or 3% compared to 4 people or 14%) which is again comparable to
previous findings from other Western nations.87 There was not enough information about
individual upbringings and religious practices to offer a more informative analysis of
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religion; however it was not uncommon for reports to mention that people (including ‘born’
Muslims) had lived previously Westernized lifestyles and had only become more noticeably
religious in the years or months prior to offending. This suggests that levels of religious
knowledge were generally lacking and offers some support to the argument that having
greater religious knowledge and understanding from a young age may well help guard against
radicalization (and in line with this, recent research has shown that non-violent Islamist
‘radicals’ are more likely to have a more nuanced understanding of their faith than those who
turn to violence).88
Marriage, on the other hand, does not appear to be a protective factor against
involvement in Islamist terrorism. Practically the same proportion (37% and 38%, or 13
individuals vs. 11), both before and after 9/11 were married, and although there was more
missing information (40% vs. 14%) among the earlier cohort, this has very little implication
for the analysis (in fact most individuals for whom marriage is not reported are likely to be
unmarried, since this is a ‘human interest’ detail that the press often report when present).
This is also congruent with previous research, confirming that marriage is common among
jihadis.89
Information about previous criminal records was generally lacking (60% unknown
versus 72% unknown) although it is worth noting that where criminal histories are present
they are likely to be reported if significant. Among the 34% (12 individuals) in the pre-9/11
period who had criminal records, 92% of these were for dishonesty-related offencesprimarily fraud, use of false identity documents and theft. This is a reflection of how some of
these offenders entered Canada in the first place, and also relates to the significant criminal
activities of the Kamel network in particular. It is also worth noting that some members of the
Kamel network were prosecuted on similar criminal charges in relation to their terrorism
convictions. One person (Hassan Zemiri) had also been previously arrested on drugs
charges.90 By contrast, just 4 individuals (14%) of the post-9/11 sample had confirmed
criminal records, including a drugs charge (Maiwand Yar91), a domestic violence charge
(Said Namouh92), shoplifting (Nishanthan Yogakrishnan93) and illegally possessing and
importing firearms (Mohammed Ali Dirie94). This is clearly not the whole picture (e.g.
several members of the Toronto 18 group successfully shoplifted chocolate bars during a
training camp expedition95) yet it raises some interesting questions.
It has been previously suggested that criminality among jihadis has been on the
increase since 9/11 because autonomous or semi-autonomous groups can no longer take
advantage of central handouts from al-Qaeda, meaning they must fund themselves.96 At first
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glance, the results here do not seem to show much support for this. However, it is worth
noting that both Yogakrishnan and Dirie committed their offences in furtherance of terrorism.
There are also several others among the post-9/11 cohort who earned criminal convictions in
conjunction with their terrorism offences, which are more revealing. One of Mohammad
Momin Khawaja’s convictions was for instructing an unwitting female associate to open a
bank account and transfer funds to a female in Britain who was in turn acting on behalf of
terrorists there97 (essentially fraud); Fahim Ahmad also pleaded guilty for complicity in
Dirie’s attempt to smuggle firearms into Canada from the US98; Steven Chand of the Toronto
18 was convicted for counselling to commit fraud over $5,00099; Said Namouh was convicted
for extortion in association with a terrorist group100; and Matin Abdul Stanikzy was charged
with counselling a female associate to commit theft in his attempt to obtain explosives.101
Overall, these findings show that most Islamist terrorists in Canada are not career
criminals.102 This is especially the case more recently, following the demise of relatively
well-established criminal-terrorist networks that functioned during the 1990s. Based on the
available information, the recent wave of militants are less likely to have a previous record,
and where they do, it may well be unrelated to their involvement in terrorism.103 However, it
is also apparent that criminality –generally related to funding or availability of materielsometimes forms a part of terrorist conspiracies.
The final background variable here is mental health. Previous studies have shown that
mental illness only appears to occur in a very small minority of Islamist militants and on the
whole it does not help explain their behaviour.104 Although specific information on this
variable is lacking (over 90% unknown) this can quite reasonably be regarded as a general
failure to report on its absence. Only 1 person in the entire sample (Asad Ansari of the
Toronto 18105) was reported to have experienced some form of illness (depression) prior to
offending. These findings are in accordance with the majority of recent research on this
issue106 and offer no support to the idea that involvement in terrorism might be generally
explained by some form of psychopathology.

Radicalization
There is an unfortunate, but acute shortage of reliable and meaningful information pertaining
to individual pathways of radicalization (defined here as the psychological, emotional and
behavioural process preceding involvement in terrorism107). This of course should not be
surprising though, given that these processes are necessarily pieced together in retrospect,
often years after the fact. For the purposes of this study, the primary aim here was to assess
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whether processes of radicalization could be classified as primarily virtual (online), social
(face-to-face) or a mixture of the two. Unsurprisingly, there was very little evidence of any
online activity in the pre-9/11 period. Only 2 individuals (the Jabarah brothers) were classed
as having radicalized via a mixture of social and virtual processes, since they were known to
frequent jihadi websites in addition to being influenced by social contacts.108 The remainder
were either classed as having radicalized primarily via social processes (37% or 13
individuals) or were unknown (57%, 20 individuals). However, in reality the vast majority of
‘unknowns’ would of course have radicalized in social situations since the Internet either did
not exist or was largely unavailable and offending often occurred in the context of established
organizations.
In the post-9/11 period there was still a great deal of missing information (55%, 16
individuals) but 2 individuals (7%) were classed as primarily socially radicalized (referring to
Omar Khadr and Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed). The remaining 38% (consisting of the 11
convicted members of the Toronto 18) were classed as having radicalized via a mixture of
online activity and social interaction. Fahim Ahmad, one of the group leaders, was active in
online Islamic forums since at least 2002109 and online jihadi propaganda became “the defacto catalyst” for the radicalization of the group.110 Ahmad created and distributed his own
highly emotive DVDs; he would print out online texts and give them to members of the group
to read; and he would instruct them to check out websites promoting jihad, in addition to
playing speeches by Anwar al-Awlaki and others in group situations.111 Online jihadi
propaganda was absorbed both individually and collectively, and served as the basis for faceto-face group discussions.
Although no ‘virtual only’ cases were confirmed in the Canadian sample, there are
others, such as Said Namouh, who was seemingly acting alone in Canada and who offended
primarily online, suggesting that the Internet may well have played a wider role in
radicalization than the current data reveal. It is safe to conclude that face-to-face social
interaction still appears to be an important factor in radicalization, but that it is likely to be
supplemented and enhanced by online jihadi propaganda. The fact that individuals in other
Western countries (such as Ryan Anderson112 in the US or Nicky Reilly113 in the UK) do
seem to have radicalized online almost entirely by themselves, means that this cannot be
ruled out in the Canadian context. Moreover, the spread of ideology via the Internet may also
have contributed to the geographic spread of cases out-with hotspots, discussed above.

Ideological Classification
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A related point of interest is whether individuals can be classified according to levels of
ideological commitment. There is insufficient information to enable a refined and reliable
system of classification on this variable; however, it is generally possible to distinguish
between a) individuals who show at least some evidence of adhering to jihadi ideology (the
vast majority, here simply termed ‘Jihadi’), b) those who appear to be particularly committed
to the cause (‘Hardcore’) as evidenced by such factors as sustained and varied activities in
support of terrorism, often including first-hand experience of violence, and c) ideological
outliers (individuals who appear to be involved for distinct reasons such as personal motives
or financial gain).
89% of the earlier cohort (31 individuals) and 86% of the latter cohort (25
individuals) were classed as Jihadis, meaning that they appeared to subscribe to jihadi
ideology, but –with the exception of the ‘Hardcore’ sub-category- no further judgement was
made as to differing levels or types of commitment within that very broad category. Just 3
individuals (9%) in the pre-9/11 sample were classed as Hardcore (these were Ahmed Said
Khadr, Fateh Kamel and Karim Said Atmani) although numerous others might arguably be
included. Only 1 individual in the post-9/11 sample was classed as Hardcore, namely Faruq
Khalil Muhammad ’Isa, who is accused of working over a relatively lengthy period of time to
send suicide bombers to Iraq. ’Isa allegedly encouraged recruits to persevere when they
showed signs of doubt, made enquiries about conducting violence himself, and told his sister
“Go learn about weapons and go attack the police and the Americans. Let it be that you
die”.114 The fact that a minority of individuals were classed as Hardcore is consistent with
previous analyses which suggest that the jihadi movement on the whole is driven by a
minority of ideologically committed ‘entrepreneurs’,115 although it is quite possible that other
highly committed individuals were missed, since this classification relies on sufficient
information.
Judgements about ideological outliers are more reliable. Among pre-9/11 starters this
included just 1 individual, Abdurahman Khadr, who was known for being a reluctant
participant at the al-Qaeda training camps and seems to have rejected the idea of violence.116
In the post-9/11 sample Abdurahman’s little brother Omar was classed as ‘unknown’ because
he was a minor at the time of offending, essentially making him a child soldier and unlikely
to have been genuinely ideologically informed. In addition, Shareef Abdelhaleem of the
Toronto 18 was classed as a criminal opportunist as well as being Jihadi, since he appeared to
be at least partially motivated by a desire to try and make money.117 Lastly, Mohamed
Abdullahi Mohamed, who fought alongside al-Shabaab in Somalia, seemed to be motivated
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by nationalism and apparently disagreed with their ideology even then.118 He has also since
spoken out against al-Shabaab in support of counter-radicalization in Canada. Taken together,
these ‘outlier’ cases are too few to indicate systematic differences between earlier and more
recent generations of Canadian militants, but they confirm previous findings119 showing that
not everyone involved in Islamist terrorism is necessarily committed to jihadi ideology.

Analysis Part 2: Operational Variables
Table 2 below summarizes the findings in relation to operational variables of Canadian
Islamist militant- in other words, what exactly they have been doing in support of terrorism.

Group Characteristics
Terrorism is generally a group phenomenon, making group characteristics a key area of
interest. Even basic descriptive features such as immediate group size are, however, difficult
to determine due to ‘fuzzy boundaries’, individual mobility and fluid networks. Because of
this, quantitative figures as presented in Table 2 tell us little, except that Canadian Islamist
militants tend to offend in relatively small groups, and that most cases are connected to wider
offending networks (although a small number of seemingly lone actors have emerged over
time).
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Table 2. Operational variable information of Canadian Islamist militants beginning their
careers before and after 9/11 (1980s-2011).
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In terms of leadership, this is also difficult to determine since it is rarely explicitly manifest
and quality data are generally lacking. The data that are available do not support the
contention that operational leaders and ‘spiritual sanctioners’120 (religious ideologues) are
universal roles within groups. There was also very little evidence, either before or after 9/11,
that demonstrated issuing and following of orders, although a notable exception on these
points is the Toronto 18 group where Fahim Ahmad and Zakariya Amara played quite clear
leadership roles. More recently, it has been alleged that Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser,
(accused of the train derailment plot), were being supported by al-Qaeda elements in Iran,
however the nature and extent of that support is presently unclear.121 In general, groups
appear to have been informally organized and leadership appears to have emerged by way of
consensus based on individual initiative, experience, knowledge, connections and capacity to
organize group activities.
Both before and after 9/11 Canadian militant activities can best be described as
collaborative and yet most often tied to foreign organizational hierarchies involving
recognized figures of authority, with autonomy varying depending on context and role.
Whilst operating in Canada individuals have had considerable autonomy to choose and
organize their own activities; however they have often maintained communication with
foreign militants in order to coordinate their efforts. When overseas themselves (e.g. while
training or taking part in combat) they have functioned more directly as part of militaristic
structures. Thus, for example, Mohammed Abdullah Warsame would have been fully
absorbed into al-Qaeda and Taliban hierarchies whilst training and fighting in Afghanistan
from 2000-2001, but his continued support activities in North America were primarily selforganized.122 Individuals such as Hassan Farhat123 or Mohamed Elmi Ibrahim124 who have
trained and/or fought overseas since 9/11 have been equally absorbed into foreign
organizational structures. Others, such as Mohammad Momin Khawaja (who assisted British
militants125), Said Namouh (who was an online Global Islamic Media Front collaborator126)
and Faruq’Isa (who allegedly helped send recruits to Iraq127) can best be described as semiautonomous.
Given the fact that autonomy has been assumed to be a defining feature of Westernbased Islamist terrorists in the post 9/11 era,128 these results are surprising. It is worth noting
though that some cases fit this description more closely than others, in particular the Toronto
18 (who made ultimately unproductive links to British and American jihadis129) and Salman
An-Noor Hossain (who independently set up his own anti-Semitic, pro-militant website130).
Based on currently available information, the cases of Abdul Matin Stanikzy (allegedly
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planning to attack a Canadian military base131) and Mohamed Hassan Hersi (accused of
planning to join al-Shabaab132) might also fall into this category. Thus, while it is still
common for Canadian Islamist militants to collaborate with overseas co-conspirators, there
have also been cases in recent years which demonstrate a willingness to pursue a terrorist
agenda in the absence of external support.

Offence Period
As mentioned above, the beginning of offence periods are designated by the first known overt
behaviour in support of terrorism and do not include preceding periods of radicalization
(which would be even more difficult to determine). Offence periods generally end via arrest,
death or the apparent voluntary cessation of behaviour in support of terrorism, although some
cases appear to be ongoing. Cases where either the start or end-date is unknown are excluded
from the analysis (5 cases pre-9/11, 6 cases post-9/11). Based on these calculations Table 2
reveals that the average offence period has decreased from 5.5 years to an average of just 1
year (and most frequently it has been less than this). These figures are in accordance with
previous findings from other Western nations133 and reflect the fact that while in the past
individuals could have quite lengthy jihadi careers without fear of intervention, counterterrorism resources have dramatically increased since 2001 and individuals are more likely to
be arrested sooner.

Operational Activity
The largest proportion of individuals in the sample both before and after 9/11 (55% and 38%,
or 18 vs. 11 individuals) involved facilitating violent jihad. This included a range of activities
aimed at enabling others to develop skills (train), travel, or otherwise perform duties in
relation to Islamist terrorism. Examples among pre-9/11 starters include Essam Hafez
Marzouk, who was an alleged trainer of mujahideen, including two individuals responsible
for the August 1998 east African embassy bombings.134 Another example is Abdullah Ahmed
Khadr who trafficked weapons for al-Qaeda.135 Post-9/11 examples include Mohammad
Momin Khawaja, who built a remote detonator for others to use,136 Zakaria Amara of the
Toronto 18, who organized the activities of others in the group,137 and Nishanthan
Yogakrishnan who shop-lifted supplies at the behest of Fahim Ahmad.138 These examples
show that facilitating behaviours (whether top-down, collaborative, or bottom-up) continue to
form a significant part of terrorist activity, while the relative reduction over time may be
related to lower levels of organizational integration.
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The next most common behaviour in the pre-9/11 sample (29%, 10 individuals)
involved overseas paramilitary-style training, but where combat or planning of attacks has
not been confirmed. Among others this included the el-Maati brothers Ahmad and Amer,139
Adil Charkaoui,140 and Amr Hamed.141 A further 17% (6 individuals) from the early part of
the sample went on to become jihadi fighters who took part in overseas combat (e.g. Ahmed
Said Khadr,142 Abdullahi Afrah143 and Abdulrahman Mansour Jabarah144). By contrast, only 2
individuals in the post-9/11 sample (7%) were classed as having received overseas training
without confirmation of combat (Ferid Ahmed Imam and Maiwand Yar, the former who
allegedly graduated to providing training, thus making him a facilitator also145). However,
another 7 people (24% of the post-9/11 sample) underwent some form of training and also
became jihadi fighters (examples include Omar Khadr146 and Saeed and Masoud Rasoul147).
An additional 2 people (Jahmaal James148 and Mohamed Hassan Hersi149) attempted to go
overseas for training and combat, and at least another 6 individuals (all part of the Toronto 18
group) engaged in domestic training exercises without even attempting to go overseas. These
results show that overseas training and combat remain popular goals for Canadian militants,
but ones that are not always fulfilled, and which may be substituted for domestic activities.
Given that terrorism is synonymous with ‘random’ acts of violence in peoples’ minds,
it is perhaps surprising that only 17% (6 individuals including Ahmed Ressam and his
helpers, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah and Abdel Rahman Fakhri Abou el-Ila, who was
convicted in Egypt150) have been directly involved in planning attacks prior to 9/11. This
figure has risen to 9 individuals (31%) since then (including 4 members of the Toronto 18,
Said Namouh –who was also planning an overseas suicide attack151- Hiva Mohammad
Alizadeh’s group, and Matin Stanikzy). Notably, all of the pre-9/11 attack plots were aimed
at foreign targets, whereas 3 of the 4 (alleged) post-9/11 plots have been aimed at Canadian
targets.152 Again, there is similarity with other Western countries where domestic Islamist
terrorism plots have been uncovered since 2001, showing that militancy in Canada has
followed wider trends, even if it is on a smaller scale.
Less common –or at least less clearly documented- has been fundraising on behalf of
others (9% and 10% -both 3 individuals- before and after 9/11). In the past this appears to
have been done more openly and seemingly on a larger scale (e.g. Ahmed Khadr giving
speeches and asking people for donations) compared to small-scale funding by individuals
relying on their own resources (e.g. Khawaja sending a few thousand dollars of his own
money). This is consistent with reports that counter-financing efforts have been successful in
reducing the flow of money to al-Qaeda.153 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that terrorism26
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financing is often difficult to detect and this part of the analysis in particular may fall short of
providing a comprehensive snapshot of the situation in Canada. For example, the
Benevolence International Fund Canada (BIF-C, established in Mississauga in 2000) was
closely tied to the Benevolence International Foundation in the US, both of which had their
assets frozen for suspected ties to terrorism in November 2002.154 More recently, the
Canadian branch of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY, established in
Mississauga in 1999 and active until 2005) was closely tied to BIF-C among other suspicious
organisations and had its charitable status revoked for failing to comply with Canada
Revenue Agency (CRA) requirements.155 There have not been any specific allegations of
fundraising for terrorism and criminal prosecutions have not been pursued against Canadians
involved in running these charities. Hence, even where such cases are suspected they may be
especially difficult to prove.
Turning attention to the active promotion of jihad (essentially trying to recruit or
influence others by glorifying terrorism) there was little evidence of this among Canadian
militants within either cohort. In the pre-9/11 sample Ahmed Khadr was known to “praise the
bravery” of mujahideen on his trips to Canada and of course raised his sons to be militants.156
Abderraouf Hannachi of the Kamel network has also been credited with influencing Ressam
to go overseas for training,157 but beyond these two borderline examples, there is no further
specific information on promotional activities (distinct to simply talking about jihad amongst
members of a group). Whilst it is quite possible that others in the sample (such as Fateh
Kamel158) were also active in promoting jihad, there is insufficient evidence to support this in
the analysis. After 9/11, there have been 4 individuals that can be reliably described as
promoting jihad. These are Fahim Ahmad, Said Namouh, Salman An-Noor Hossain, and
Mohamed Hassan Hersi (who is also charged with counselling another person to engage in
terrorism159). It is significant that Namouh and Hossain were both exclusively online jihadi
promoters, demonstrating the way in which the growth of the Internet has opened up new
avenues of opportunity for Islamist militants (and confirming that Canadians have adopted
technology in similar fashion to other Western jihadis). Perhaps even more importantly
though, when we compare Canadian ‘promoters’ to others such as Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza
and Abdullah el-Faisal from the UK or Anwar al-Awlaki from the US, there is a marked
difference. Canada has clearly not hosted a globally renowned ideologue with established
connections to bona fide militants, nor have its online jihadi promoters been as prolific or
admired as the likes of Aabid Khan, Younis Tsouli or Samir Khan. This comparative absence
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of highly influential individuals dedicated to propagating the ideology helps explain Canada’s
relatively low rate of Islamist terrorism.
The final operational role found among Canadian militants was membership in a
terrorist network where no further information was available about what exactly they did.
This referred to Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub, Mohamed Harkat and Mahmoud Jaballah, each of
whom began their militant careers in the 1990s and were detained on security certificates.
This category does not include others who were members of terrorist networks whose
specific role is known and is a by-product of insufficient information. As discussed above in
relation to individual classifications, these results also suggest that counter-terrorism in
Canada has become more effective over the years since more recent allegations are specific
and more clearly substantiated.
Regardless of role differences, Table 2 also shows that 86% (30 individuals) in the
pre-9/11 category were focused exclusively overseas in terms of what they were trying to
achieve, and a corresponding figure of 86% travelled overseas in furtherance of those goals.
By contrast, up until the end of 2011 only 45% of post-9/11 Canadian militants (13
individuals) have been focused exclusively on overseas events while the remainder have
shown at least some willingness or desire to affect change by way of domestic operations.
Similarly only 41% (12 individuals) in the post-9/11 category have travelled overseas in
relation to their jihadi activities. As previously discussed in relation to targets of attack, these
findings resonate with the growth of ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorism in the West more
generally and confirm that Canada has become a legitimate target in the eyes of jihadis. At
the same time, we must not ignore the fact that participation in overseas conflict remains a
highly sought-after prize. Indeed, this accounts for the majority of known cases uncovered
from 2012-2013.

International Dimensions and Associations
International connections were discussed in relation to leadership, but are dealt with here in
terms of location and type of associations. All cases that began before9/11 (and almost all
individuals within those cases) had established ties to foreign militants. The majority of those
ties (66% or 23 individuals) were to al-Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Af/Pak),
followed by France, Egypt, Bosnia (14% or 5 individuals each) and the UK (11%, 4
individuals). Other locations included Algeria, Italy, Libya, Somalia, Yemen, the US,
Chechnya, South East Asia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Lebanon and Azerbaijan. Among those
beginning in the post-9/11 period 73% of cases (but only 48% of individuals) established
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contact with foreign terrorists. The top location has remained the Af-Pak region, but this has
reduced to 14% (4 individuals), which is equalled by Iraq. This is followed by the UK and
US (both 10%, 3 individuals), Somalia (7%, 2 individuals) and Chechnya, Austria and
Tunisia (each 1 individual or 3%). These figures are not the entire story, since numerous
unnamed individuals thought to have gone to Somalia are not included in the sample due to
lacking information, and for that reason there has likely been a more pronounced shift
towards the Horn of Africa as a key location. Additional, recent cases involving Canadians
who joined al-Shabaab support this assessment; however Canadian jihadis have also since
joined or been in contact with militants in Mauritania, Algeria and Iran, and as many as 50
individuals are estimated to have joined the conflict in Syria.160 Ultimately, the current results
clearly indicate a change over time, with international associations becoming less
concentrated within one primary region, and more dispersed, according to changing
international circumstances and individual opportunities.
Moreover, the overall quality of connections has also changed. Pre-9/11 offenders
were linked to members of established foreign terrorist networks, if not identifiable
organizations, who commanded considerable resources. Although individuals have still been
able to make such connections (such as Imam and Yar, Faruq ’Isa and the various ‘Jihadi
Fighters’), others have managed only fleeting and relatively empty connections to other
aspiring militants who were not part of organizations and did not have much to offer in terms
of resources. Khawaja’s British friends relied on him for technical expertise and money, and
Fahim Ahmad’s connections with American and British militants did not, in the end, yield
results. Even among those who have made contact with foreign terrorist organizations such as
al-Shabaab, there was little evidence that those individuals received the same kind of support
as for example, Ressam did- at least not outside of foreign theatres of conflict. Hence, the
data up to and including 2011 suggest that foreign connections are not always as meaningful
as in the past, lending support to the contention that Western-based terrorists have become
more (involuntarily) autonomous and more ‘amateurish’ over time. Practical restraints may
have also contributed to the growing domestic focus of operations, suggesting that this may
be the result of pragmatic concerns as much as ideological developments. This does not of
course mean that we can rule out the possibility that individuals may still be trained up
overseas and sent back to Canada to carry out attacks. Indeed, current information on the alQaeda-linked train derailment plot indicates that Essaghaier may have received training in
Iran before returning to Montreal.161 Nevertheless, it is also important to note that he had
been evicted from his apartment for problematic behaviour and was effectively homeless at
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the time of his arrest- factors which are hardly suggestive of sophisticated training or high
levels of ongoing support.162
Finally, the degree of connectivity of individuals in the sample can also be crudely
measured by examining named associations, both foreign and domestic. As shown in Table 2,
71% of the pre-9/11 sample (25 individuals) had named foreign associations and 74% of
them (26 individuals) had named domestic associations (i.e. connections to other Canadianbased terrorists outside their immediate case). This shows a high degree of connectivity both
internationally and within the militant community of Canada. In comparison, only 34% of the
post-9/11 sample (10 individuals) had named foreign associates, and only 13% (4
individuals) had named domestic associates. This suggests that we know less about the
foreign connections of those who have them (as for example when individuals are absorbed
into the conflict in Somalia) while on the domestic stage Islamist terrorism has become more
fragmented.163

The Role of the Internet
It is now generally accepted that the Internet plays an important role in the lives of Westernbased jihadis; however, analysts differ in the emphasis that they place upon this
technology.164 In accordance with findings regarding radicalization, no use of the Internet
could be determined for the vast majority of pre-9/11 starters, but of course many of them
were operating before it was invented. Uses that were reported among the early cohort
included accessing propaganda (the Jabarah brothers165), communication (Mohammed
Jabarah166; Mohammed Warsame167), and fundraising (Ahmed Khadr168). Others almost
certainly made use of the Internet also (for example Kassem Daher collaborated with others
who raised funds online169) but it is safe to say that it has become more prominent over
time.170
Information was available for 69% of the post-9/11 starters (20 individuals). The top
reported uses included accessing propaganda and/or pro-jihadi forums (14 individuals or
48%), followed by communication (applying to 31% of the sample or 9 individuals), creating
and distributing pro-jihadi materials (14%, 4 individuals), conducting research related to
attacks (Khawaja; Amara), and making purchases for terrorist activity (again referring to
Amara, who seemingly purchased IED components online171). Again, percentages are
unlikely to be precise given missing information; however, the results clearly demonstrate
that Canadian Islamist militants are using the Internet for a variety of purposes. More general
and ‘benign’ uses, such as viewing propaganda and communicating appear to be the most
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common, while the more ‘assertive’, innovative or operation-specific behaviours are
somewhat rarer and depend upon the nature of the case.

Stated Motivations
Stated motivations, whether made in private or in public, provide an important window into
the mindset of Islamist terrorists. There was not, however, a great deal of publicly available
information available for many of the individuals in the sample, especially those who began
offending prior to 9/11 and where media coverage has been sparse. The information that was
available did not, on the whole, provide any surprising insights. Canadian jihadis, both before
and after 9/11 appear to have been primarily ideologically motivated by a combination of
anger at foreign policy, a religious sense of social identity along with religiously-framed
justifications for violence, an altruistic desire to help fellow Muslims in conflict zones, and a
desire for revenge against the perceived enemies of Islam. This motivational melting pot
appears to have remained relatively stable over time, albeit with shifts in the specific
locations of concern and the targets of anger. In particular, Canada itself became a legitimate
target after participating in the war in Afghanistan. But interestingly (in the Toronto 18 case)
venom was also directed at Canada by way of “guilt by association” because of ties with the
US and because of generalized perceptions that Canada was “discriminating against
Muslims”.172
These findings demonstrate that despite the apparent fact that Canadian Muslims on
the whole appear to be satisfied with their country,173 there are of course a minority who are
not. However, it is noteworthy that domestic grievances were secondary to global political
issues and members of the Toronto group did not describe personal experiences of
discrimination in Canada, suggesting that dissatisfaction with the domestic situation of the
home country may well develop as a product of radicalization, rather than necessarily driving
it. Consistent with this interpretation, there is evidence that the legitimacy of an attack in
Canada needed additional justification, at least for some group members. In one recorded
conversation, Stephen Chand stated that Islam did not permit an attack in Canada if a person
had accepted the right to stay there, but a way around this was to leave and then re-enter
without official authorization.174 Ahmad’s response to this was that the Canadian government
spied on its own citizens, and this voided any implicit covenant.175 Thus, justification can
follow on the desire to attack, rather than preceding it (in line with the idea that practical
restraints may shape apparently ideologically-driven behaviour).
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Briefly, there were also hints in some post-9/11 cases of additional motivations
including anti-Semitism (An-Noor Hossain), financial motivations (Shareef Abdelhaleem),
nationalism (Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed), and involuntary participation (Abdurahman
Khadr). In line with the above discussion of ideological classification, although jihadi
ideology may dominate as the primary source of explicit motivation, there is clearly room for
individual idiosyncrasy.

Analysis Part 3: Investigations and Legal Outcomes
The final category of interest, as depicted in Table 3, relates to investigations and outcomes.
Regarding investigations, information on how they were initiated was recorded, along with
the primary source of evidence and the length of investigation from beginning through to
arrest (excluding post-charge). As might be expected, missing information was frequent and
judgements were sometimes difficult to make. Investigations sometimes seem to start out,
only to be abandoned, and then re-initiated down the line. For the purposes of consistent
analysis, if the individual(s) concerned were not continually a target of investigation, then the
most recent ‘initiation-point’ was used. For example, in the case of Ressam, although he had
previously come to the attention of Canadian investigators, he was ultimately not detected
until the ‘chance’ intervention of US law enforcement (border security).176

Table 3. Investigative and outcome variables in Canadian Islamist terrorism cases beginning
before and after 9/11 (1980s-2011).

Investigations
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Information on the initiation of investigations was available in 59% of cases/groups
beginning prior to 9/11 (i.e. 19/32), and in 80% of cases since then (12/15). The available
information indicates that among the earlier cases, 22% of investigations (7 cases) were
initiated via international counter-terrorism (CT) efforts, such as the French investigation of
the Kamel network, or Amer el-Maati and Amr Hamed, who were identified by documents
found in Afghanistan.177 A further 19% of investigations (6 cases) began via domestic CT
efforts, including monitoring communities and individuals (e.g. the Jabarah brothers178) and
numerous arrests arising from the Ressam investigation (such as Abderraouf Hannachi179).
The remainder of known cases were either initiated by way of overlapping law enforcement
functions relating to border protection, or else were not applicable (Bilal Philips and
Abdullahi Afrah were not seemingly investigated).
From what is known about post-9/11 cases until the end of 2011, there is not a huge
difference, although the range of sources appears to be somewhat more diverse. International
and domestic CT efforts account for 33% and 20% of cases (5 vs. 3) respectively (bearing in
mind that we are focusing on cases here and not individuals; 52% of the latter have been
detected via domestic CT since 9/11). Other sources include jihadi publications (Mohamed
Elmi Ibrahim180), domestic law enforcement (Stanikzy181), and one public tip-off (Mohamed
Hassan Hersi182). There was no apparent investigation in the case of Mohamed Abdullahi
Mohamed.
Note that the relatively strong international component to counter-terrorism over time
should not be surprising, given continued international links and an emphasis on international
CT cooperation. It is also noteworthy that within CT there appears to have been some
changes. Although human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) in the
form of wiretaps are both continued key sources of information, online electronic SIGINT
has clearly become more important over the past decade. Indeed, when discussing the
importance of the Internet in relation to Islamist terrorism, it is often forgotten that it is a
double-edged sword for jihadists and presents opportunities on both sides of the law in equal
measure.
In terms of the length of investigations, in accordance with findings that offence
periods have shortened over time, so too have investigations (see Table 3). They are also
naturally shorter than offending careers, because individuals are not immediately detected.
Primary sources of evidence were identified in 78% of pre-9/11 cases and 93% of
post-9/11 cases (i.e. 25 vs. 14). Among known cases beginning before 9/11, top forms of
evidence included confessions (25% or 8 cases; though note these are not confessions in a
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court of law); secret evidence as in security certificates (19%, or 6 cases), which, from what
is known involved a combination of HUMINT and SIGINT; and combined evidence (19%)
where no particular form of evidence (HUMINT/ SIGINT/ physical evidence/ surveillance/
other) could be treated as primary over and above the others. In more recent cases, the
primary forms of evidence have been HUMINT (20%, 3 cases) e.g. as with Ferid Imam,
identified by an American associate183; combined evidence (20%) e.g. Khawaja184; and
SIGINT (13%, 2 cases) e.g. Faruq ’Isa.185 In addition, while no pre-9/11 cases were reported
to have involved undercover agents or informants (covert human intelligence sources/ CHIS)
they formed the core of the Toronto 18 case.
Overall, these findings are congruent with results above showing a relative decrease
in the number of confessions/admissions, a decline since 2003 in the use of extra-judicial
sanctions, and an increase in the use of electronic SIGINT. Other than these legal and
technological changes, which reflect improved CT capacities, there are no obvious systematic
differences in investigations before and after 9/11.

Legal Outcomes
Only 46% of Canadian Islamist terrorists who began their career prior to 9/11 (16
individuals) have been prosecuted; this figure is 48% (14 individuals) among post-9/11
offenders, although a further 31% (9 individuals) have been charged, with outcomes pending.
These figures are in accordance with the individual classifications (see above).
For those who were prosecuted, 88% of pre-9/11 starters (14 individuals) were
convicted, with 12% guilty pleas; the average sentence was 8.8 years; 3 individuals received
life sentences (in Libya, Algeria and the US); at the time the analysis was conducted, for 1
individual (Ressam) sentencing was still pending after his original sentence was deemed
inappropriate (since then he has been sentenced to 37 years186); 1 individual’s sentence
(Abdelmajid Dahoumane) is unknown; 1 person (Mustapha Labsi) has been convicted twice,
once in France and once in Algeria;187 and another, Adel Boumezbeur, was due to stand trial
in Algeria after being convicted in France, although the outcome is unknown.188 For those
prosecuted who began offending in the post-9/11 era, 50% (7 individuals) were convicted and
50% pleaded guilty. At first glance this would seem to contradict the above contention that
there has been a decrease in ‘confessions’ as evidence, however, the earlier admissions often
occurred under interrogation or other circumstances, often in cases that did not go to trial, and
more recent confessions were often in the face of overwhelming evidence. After 9/11 the
average sentence has increased to 10.25 years, and 4 individuals have been given life
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sentences (all in Canada), though as in the UK they are still eligible for parole following
minimum terms.
Taken together, it is clear that Canadian Islamist terrorists are far more likely to be
prosecuted (and to be prosecuted in Canada); they are more likely to plead guilty; and they
are more likely to receive a longer sentence.

Summary and Conclusions
Since the 1980s there has been a steady rate of individuals becoming involved in Islamist
terrorism in Canada. Over time, it has become more likely for these offenders to be
prosecuted in Canada. There has also been a geographic shift in Canadian networks as
Montreal has diminished in significance as compared to Toronto, with isolated cases
cropping up in areas outside of major urban areas.
All confirmed Canadian jihadis have been males, although there have been signs more
recently that females are getting involved as well. The average age remains in the 20s,
although this has reduced from the late to mid-range, consistent with more proactive CT.
Illegal entry into Canada has apparently ceased to become a factor and, over time, more
Islamist militants have been born and/or raised there. Ethnic heritage has become less
dominated by North Africans, and more diverse, seemingly related to geo-political changes
worldwide.
The picture regarding educational attainment is unclear, however it seems as if most
individuals in the sample had at least basic high school education and a small minority
continue to achieve university qualifications. However, in terms of occupation, there appears
to have been a slight overall decline, possibly related to age. There is little information about
prior religious practice, but generally this seems to increase as part of the radicalization
process (albeit with a narrow focus). Marriage remains common. Most Canadian jihadis do
not seem to have a previous criminal record (and therefore have not radicalized in prison)
although there have been a few cases that demonstrate a willingness to commit crime in order
help finance terrorist operations or acquire materiel. Canadian involvement in Islamist
terrorism cannot be explained by mental illness.
There is an overall disappointing lack of reliable information relating to individual
processes of radicalization, although the Internet has clearly become more pervasive over
time. There are few indications that individuals have radicalized entirely online, rather
absorption of online propaganda tends to supplement and invigorate face-to-face interactions.
Ideologically, the vast majority of individuals over time can be classed as ‘Jihadis’, with a
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minority who are ‘Hardcore’. There are also a handful of ideological outliers motivated by
non-ideological and sometimes personal factors.
Individuals in the sample were often part of relatively small groups, often with some
form of external links. Leadership can best be described as collaborative, however it clearly
varies by context and recent cases indicate a willingness to proceed with terrorist operations
in the absence of any external support. Individual offending careers have become shorter in
recent years, again consistent with more vigilant and effective CT.
A large proportion of individuals in the sample, before and after 9/11, have been
involved in facilitating terrorism. Overseas training and combat have also remained popular,
although some individuals have been willing to train at home rather than attempt international
travel. More individuals over time have become involved in planning to conduct terrorist
attacks, and there has been a clear trend indicating that domestic attacks in Canada are now
deemed viable, even though numbers are low. Fundraising activities have become less visible
and apparently smaller-scale. There have been more examples of overt promotion of jihadi
ideology, notably online, but it is apparent that Canada has lacked a truly influential jihadi
ideologue either before or after 9/11. Across different types of activity there has been a
substantial decrease in the proportion of individuals who are focused only on overseas events
and a corresponding decrease in international travel. This is indicative of a growing
willingness to conduct domestic operations.
There has been a reduction in international links and there has been change in the
location of those links- becoming more diverse and less dominated by any single global
hotspot. Unconfirmed information indicates that Somalia –and now Syria- have become more
prominent than current, reliable data suggest. While the nature of overseas connections may
have become more limited (with less support apparently being provided outside of conflict
zones) foreign ‘sponsorship’ for attacks launched within or from Canada cannot be ruled out.
Meanwhile on the domestic stage, Canadian Islamist terrorism networks have become more
fragmented.
The Internet has become more prominent over time in the lives of jihadis. Available
information suggests that the most common uses in Canada are accessing propaganda,
communication, disseminating material, and researching attacks.
Motives have, on the whole, stayed quite stable over time, primarily revolving around
intermingled themes of foreign policy, religion, altruism and revenge. Canada itself appears
to be targeted mostly for its support of the war in Afghanistan, but there are signs that jihadis
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harbour generalized domestic grievances also. A minority of individuals are motivated by
personal or idiosyncratic concerns.
Relating to investigations, there continues to be a combination of domestic and
international CT efforts, and the average length of investigation appears to have reduced, in
accordance with shorter offence periods.189 There have been no clear changes in the type of
evidence that is used, except for the growth in electronic SIGINT, reflecting advances in
technology. Finally, in terms of outcomes, Canadian Islamist militants are more likely to be
prosecuted, more likely to be prosecuted in Canada, and to receive longer sentences.
When viewed as a whole, the background variables, operational behaviours and
investigations and outcomes clearly demonstrate the ‘home-grown’ nature of Canadian
Islamist terrorism. In all three areas, the Canadian homeland has taken on greater significance
and changes that have occurred are generally in accordance with existing analyses of homegrown Islamist terrorism in the West190 (thus lending a degree of support to these
conclusions). In particular, the increase in individuals born and/or raised in Canada, the
growing domestic focus of operations, and the apparently more limited nature of overseas
support for those based in Canada, are significant in this regard. The domestic situation is still
shaped by the global context and international links have far from disappeared, but foreign
support outside of conflict zones, on the whole, is less substantial than in the past. This is
consistent with a reduced threat in terms of likely capacity to perpetrate large-scale,
sophisticated attacks, whilst at the same time there has evidently been an increase in
Canadian counter-terrorism capabilities.191 This must of course be viewed in the context of an
increased likelihood of domestic attack, regardless of magnitude, and an ever more diverse
threat (reflected, for example, in ethnic backgrounds and geographic location of cases).
Moreover, given the documented similarities to other Western nations thus far, Canada must
be prepared for further challenging developments that have been observed elsewhere,
especially so-called ‘lone-wolf’ terrorists and ‘active shooter’ scenarios, which may be
especially difficult to detect in advance.
Having pointed out a number of similarities between the Canadian experience of
jihadi terrorism and that of similar countries, it is also important to address differences. Of
primary significance here are rates of terrorism Although complete, directly comparable
datasets are yet to emerge, available information suggests that the rate of Islamist terrorism
cases in Canada is not only low in absolute terms, but is also among the lowest in the West,
relative to its Muslim population size.192 In the past, scholars have explained this as part of a
more general difference between North America and Europe whereby the former has been
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viewed as partially inoculated against ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorism due to the more
successful integration of Muslim immigrants.193 The above discussion of motivations
established that domestic grievances may still play a role, and Canada has not been without
its controversies relating to the ‘War on Terror’. The use of security certificates, Canadians
tortured abroad and the case of Omar Khadr in particular have caused outcry. Yet Muslims
report relatively high levels of satisfaction with life in Canada194 and this may well have
militated against broadly experienced frustrations that might find expression in acts of
terrorism. The ‘immigration-integration hypothesis’ thus contributes to understanding of predisposing risk, but it does not by itself offer a compelling, comprehensive explanation of
differential rates of terrorism. Rather, it seems that a number of factors have combined to
afford Canada a degree of ‘protection’.195
In addition to a seemingly successful approach to Muslim immigration, Canada has
been fortunate not to play host to more significant jihadi ideologues. Ostensibly non-violent
anti-democratic Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir have also been lacking196 (and recent
activity appears to have been minimal). Moreover, Canada was fortunate to have had an early
‘wake-up call’ with the arrest of Ressam since this led to dismantling of a significant
proportion of existing networks. Canada also, perhaps wisely, stayed out of the Iraq war,
avoiding what became the ‘icing on the cake’ for justifying domestic attacks as far as
militants elsewhere in the West have been concerned.197 Given that anger at Western foreign
policy has been a key driver of Islamist militancy, and that the necessary conditions for
involvement in the ‘Global Salafi jihad’ are a combination of ideological and social
exposure,198 it is evident that these critical, direct motivators have also been comparatively
lacking in Canada.
Of course it should not be assumed that the situation cannot change. This study has
clearly established that Canada has become a target regardless of ‘protective’ factors and it
can be reasonably assumed that this trend will continue. Furthermore, with rapid growth
expected in the Muslim population,199 combined with erratic global developments the
situation in the future is difficult to predict.
The Canadian security apparatus has successfully contained the threat so far and
RCMP, CSIS and other policing agencies have also undertaken encouraging community
engagement exercises (some directly related to CT, others much less so).200 The Canadian
government furthermore recently unfurled its national counter-terrorism strategy, including
plans to expand ‘soft’ CT measures.201 The Canadian strategy follows a similar format to
those of the UK and Australia, identifying four main strands for countering terrorism
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revolving around proactive investigation (‘Detect’), target hardening (‘Deny’), contingency
planning (‘Respond’) and building community resilience against extremist ideologies
(‘Prevent’).202 The latter element entails countering violent extremism (CVE) by way of
community partnerships and represents the most novel development, although similar
measures are in place already in the UK and Australia, and the US unveiled a strategic
implementation plan for CVE last year. 203 This marks a significant development in Canada.
Members of the Somali community in Ottawa have held at least one conference aimed at
discussing ways to combat radicalization of Somali youth,204 and there are a handful of
figures in the community in the Toronto area who previously developed their own approaches
to countering radicalization.205 But such ‘grassroots’ efforts have not so far received support
from the Canadian government and until the release of the new CT strategy paper there were
few signs that Ottawa was considering investing in counter-radicalization (either in
communities or within prisons for convicted terrorists206) as part of a more comprehensive
CT strategy.
In light of the continuation of the threat, the potential for localised militant ‘hotspots’
to persist over time and the clearly more developed domestic component as suggested in the
current report, plans for CVE within Canada appear well-founded. But while there are
grounds for cautious optimism, it is worth noting that CVE in the UK has been fraught with
difficulties centred around choosing appropriate community partners and implementing
programs in such a way as to avoid inadvertently stigmatizing the very communities which
are meant to be engaged and strengthened.207 The road ahead for Canada thus remains
potentially rocky and will depend upon a number of factors including consistent, clear
guidelines for community engagement, identifiable goals, and an ongoing commitment to
evaluation of interventions.208
It is beyond the scope of the current paper to delve further into Canadian CT;
however, a first step for effectively countering any threat is to understand it. This research
serves as a starting point on which further studies can build and add to what we know about
Islamist terrorism in the Canadian context.
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Appendix A: Included Cases
Cases included in the analysis are listed in chronological order according to when they began.
Case numbers are followed by individual names, brief case description, known offence
period, and classification (basis for inclusion).

Pre-9/11
1. Ahmed Said Khadr. Al-Qaeda (AQ) facilitator killed in Pakistan. Active 1986-2003.
Killed in Action (KIA)/ Extra-judicial sanctions (international).
2. Mustafa Mohamed Krer. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group fundraiser. Active 1987-1998.
Overseas conviction (Libya)/ Confession.
3. Essam Hafez Marzouk. AQ operative imprisoned in Egypt. Active 1988-1998. Overseas
conviction (Egypt).
4. Fateh Kamel. Montreal jihadi network. Active 1990-2001. Overseas conviction (France).
5. Ahmad Abou el-Maati. Trained in Afghanistan. Active 1991-1998. Confession.
6. Amer el-Maati. Trained in Afghanistan, suspected AQ operative. Active 1990-2001…
Public allegations.
7. Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub. Alleged senior member of Vanguards of Conquest. Active
1992-2000. Overseas conviction (Egypt)/ Extra-judicial sanctions.
8. Kassem Daher. Alleged jihadi support network. Active 1995-1998. Legal allegations
(US).
9. Mourad Ikhlef. Montreal jihadi network. Active 1993-2001. Overseas conviction
(Algeria).
10. Adil Charkaoui. Alleged AQ sleeper agent. Active 1993-2003. Extra-judicial sanctions.
11. Bilal Philips. Sending military trainers to Bosnia. Active 1992… Confession.
12. Karim Said Atmani. Montreal jihadi network. Active 1994-1998. Overseas conviction
(France).
13. Abdullah Ahmed Khadr. Arms dealer for AQ. Active 1994-2004. Confession/ Legal
allegations (US).
14. Abdurahman Khadr. Trained at AQ camps in Afghanistan. Active 1994-2001.
Confession.
15. Mohamed Harkat. Alleged AQ sleeper agent. Active 1994-2001. Extra-judicial
sanctions.
16. Abdellah Ouzghar. Montreal jihadi network; Convicted for criminal activity in support
of terrorism. Active …1996. Overseas conviction (France).
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17. Abderraouf Hannachi. Montreal jihadi network; Implicated by Ressam. Active 19961999. Overseas conviction (Tunisia).
18. Mahmoud es-Sayyid Jaballah. Suspected member of al-Jihad. Active 1996-2001. Extrajudicial sanctions/ Overseas conviction (Egypt).
19. Mustapha Labsi. Montreal jihadi network; Assisted Abu Doha in UK. Active 19962001. Overseas convictions (France/ Algeria).
20. Adel Boumezbeur. Montreal jihadi network; Convicted for criminal activity in support
of terrorism. Active …2001. Overseas conviction (France).
21. Abdullahi Afrah. Union of Islamic Courts leader. Active 1997-2008. KIA (Somalia).
22. Amr Hamed. Trained in Afghanistan. Active …1998. KIA (Afghanistan).
23. Ahmed Ressam, Abdelmajid Dahoumane, Mokhtar Haouari, Samir Ait Mohamed.
Montreal jihadi network; Millennium bomb plot. Active 1998-1999. 3x Overseas
convictions (US/ Algeria), 1x Legal allegations (US)/ Extra-judicial sanctions.
24. Abderraouf Jdey. Suspected AQ operative. Active 1999… Public allegations.
25. Faker Ben Abdelazziz Boussora. Suspected AQ operative. Active 1999… Public
allegations.
26. Abu Sufian al-Salamabi Muhammed Ahmed 'Abd al-Razziq. Designated AQ
financier. Active 1999… Extra-judicial sanctions (US).
27. Djamel Saiid Ali Ameziane. Captured in Afghanistan, detained in Guantanamo. Active
2000-2001. Extra-judicial sanctions (US).
28. Abdulrahman Mansour Jabarah. AQ operative. Active 2000-2003. KIA (Saudi
Arabia).
29. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah. AQ operative. Active 2000-2002. Overseas conviction
(US).
30. Mohammed Abdullah Warsame. Fought in Afghanistan, continued support. Active
2000-2003. Overseas conviction (US).
31. Hassan Zemiri. Montreal jihadi network; trained in Afghanistan. Active …2001. Extrajudicial sanctions (US).
32. Abdel Rahman Fakhri Abou el-Ila. Planning attacks in Egypt. Active 2001-2001.
Overseas conviction (Egypt).

Post-9/11
33. Hassan Farhat. Allegedly joined Ansar al-Islam in Iraq. Active 2001… Public
allegations.
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34. Omar Khadr. Afghanistan combatant. Active …2002. Overseas conviction (US).
35. Mohammad Momin Khawaja. Provided logistic support to UK jihadis. Active 20022004. Prosecuted.
36. Saeed Sobrahatollah Muhammad Rasoul and Masoud Rasoul. Allegedly joined Ansar
al-Islam in Iraq. Active 2002… Public allegations.
37. Rudwan Khalil Abubaker. Fought in Chechnya. Active …2003. KIA (Chechnya).
38. Fahim Ahmad, Zakariya Amara, Shareef Abdelhaleem, Saad Khalid, Saad Gaya,
Amin Mohamed Durrani, Jahmaal James, Steven Vikash Chand, Mohammed Ali
Dirie, Asad Ansari and Nishanthan Yogakrishnan. ‘Toronto 18’. Active 2005-2006.
Prosecuted.
39. Said Namouh. AQ propagandist. Active 2006-2007. Prosecuted.
40. Ferid Ahmed Imam and Maiwand Yar. AQ trainers. Active 2006… Legal allegations
(Canada/ US).
41. Salman An-Noor Hossain. Ran extremist website. Active 2007… Legal allegations
(non-terror).
42. Hiva Mohammad Alizadeh, Misbahuddin Ahmed and Khurram Syed Sher. Alleged
plot to bomb Parliament Hill. Active 2008-2010. Legal allegations.
43. Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed. Fought for al-Shabaab. Active 2008-2009. Confession.
44. Faruq Khalil Muhammad ’Isa aka Sayfildin Tahrir Sharif. Alleged facilitator for
Iraqi militant network. Active 2008-2011. Legal allegations (US).
45. Mohammed Elmi Ibrahim. Fought for al-Shabaab. Active 2009-2010. KIA (Somalia).
46. Matin Abdul Stanikzy. Alleged plot to bomb Canadian military base. Active …2010.
Legal allegations.
47. Mohamed Hassan Hersi. Alleged attempt to join al-Shabaab. Active 2010-2011. Legal
allegations.

Appendix B. Excluded cases
Notable excluded cases are listed in chronological order according to alleged activities or
dates of allegations, followed by reason for exclusion.

1. Ahmed al-Kaysee. Alleged Afghan war veteran. 1980s/90s. Insufficient information.
2. Hassan Almrei. Trained in Afghanistan. 1990-1996. Prior to coming to Canada.
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3. Mohamedouh Ould Slahi. Suspected AQ recruiter. 1990-2000. Visitor (non-Canadian
resident).
4. Abdullah Almalki. Suspected terrorist, tortured in Syria. 1992-2002. Released without
charge.
5. Mohamed Omary, Abdel Boumezbeur, Nabil Ikhlef, Said Gasmi, Nacer Hamaidi,
Said Arar, Hamid Aich, Abdel Hakim Tizegha and Laifa Khabou. Montreal jihadi
network associates. 1990s. Insufficient information/ Non-residents.
6. Muayyed Nureddin. Suspected terrorist, tortured in Syria. 1996-2003. Released without
charge.
7. Fahad al-Shehri. Suspected terrorist, deported to Saudi Arabia. 1996-1997.
Unconfirmed.
8. Kaleem Akhtar. Linked to Wadih el-Hage. 1997. Unconfirmed.
9. Idriss. Alleged AQ operative. 1998. Insufficient information.
10. Huseyincan Celil aka Guler Dilaver. Convicted Uighur terrorist. 2000. Prior to coming
to Canada/ Non-Global-Salafi Jihad (GSJ).
11. Nageeb Abdul Jabbar Mohammed al-Hadi. Questioned re. 9/11. Unconfirmed.
12. Benmar Benatta. Suspected terrorist held in US for 5 years. 2001. Released without
charge.
13. Moussa Mohamed Khalifa. Alleged member of GSPC. 2001. Visitor/ Unconfirmed.
14. Ahmad Shehab. Uncle of suspected terrorist Nabil al-Marabh. 2001. Never charged.
15. Liban Hussein. Assets frozen for financing terrorism. 2001. Quashed on lack of
evidence.
16. Maher Arar. Suspected terrorist, tortured in Syria. 2002. Released without charge.
17. Nizar bin Muhammad Naser Nawar. Tunisian suicide bomber. 2002. Unconfirmed
significance of time in Canada.
18. Arwad al-Boushi. Detained in Syria relating to Muslim Brotherhood involvement. 2002.
Unconfirmed.
19. Amine Mezbar. Accused of plotting to bomb US embassy in Paris. 2002. Acquitted.
20. Zahoor Hussain, Muhammad Waheed, Fahim Kayani, Imran Khan, Sajjad Ahmad,
Manzoor Qadar Joyia, Yousaf Rasheed, Muhammad Asif Aziz, Kishif Siddique,
Moahmmed Asif, Mohammad Akhtar, Muhammad Waliu Siddiqui, Muhammad
Naeem, Saif Ullah Khan, Aqeel Ahmed, Jahan Zain Sawhney, Muddasar Awan,
Muhammad Nouman, Anwar ur-Rehman, Shehzad Khurram Toor, Unnamed 1,
Unnamed 2, Unnamed 3. Project Thread. 2003. No terrorism charges pursued.
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21. Kamal Elbahja and Azar Tagiev. Disappeared after going to Chechnya with Rudwan
Abubaker. 2003. Unconfirmed.
22. Abu Abdul Rahman al-Iraqi. Alleged leader n Iraqi insurgency. 2003-2006…
Unconfirmed.
23. Kassim Mohamed. Filmed CN Tower, questioned in Egypt. 2004. Released without
charge.
24. Aumar Alsorani. Detained in Iraq. 2004. Unconfirmed.
25. Qayyum Abdul Jamal, Yasin Abdi Mohamed, Ahmad Mustafa Ghany, Ibrahim
Alkhalel Aboud, Sahl Syed, Unnamed minor 1, Unnamed minor 2, Unnamed minor
3. Toronto 18 network. 2005-2006. Charges stayed/ Unconfirmed.
26. Zaynab Khadr. Investigated for suspected terrorism offences. 2005. Never charged.
27. Assem Hammoud. Involved in plot to attack tunnels in New York. 2006. Unconfirmed
significance of time in Canada.
28. Tahawwur Hussein Rana. Assisted David Headley in Danish attack plot. 2008-2009.
Included in US sample (never offended in Canada).
29. Muhannad al-Farekh. Associate of Ferid Imam and Maiwand Yar. 2006. Not charged.
30. Sohail Qureshi. Arrested in Afghanistan. 2007. Released without charge.
31. Abdifatah Mohamed Ibrahim. Accused of terrorism offences in Somalia. Unconfirmed
identity.
32. Khalid Aden Noor, Mustafa Ali, Ahmed Heybe Ahmed, Abdirahman Yusuf,
Mustafa Mohamed, Mohamed Abscir and Mohamed Ali Gacal. ‘Somali 6’- possible
associates of Mohamed Elmi Ibrahim. 2009. Unconfirmed. Note- Mahad Ali Dhore was
also originally excluded from the sample, however it has since been reported that he was
killed whilst taking part in an al-Shabaab terrorist attack in Mogadishu in April 2013.
33. Abu Shahid, Jeam Paull, Leman Langlois, James Richard, Otto Paul, Thomas, Paul
Gall, Unnamed 1, Unnamed 2, Unnamed 3, Unnamed 4 and Unnamed 5. Allegedly
trained in Afghanistan. 2010. Unconfirmed.
34. Muhan Jeans aka Abdirahman the Canadian. Killed in Somalia. 2011. Unconfirmed
identity.
35. Asli Nur and Unnamed Female. Allegedly joined al-Shabaab. 2011. Unconfirmed.
36. Unnamed Male 1 and Unnamed Male 2. Allegedly joined al-Shabaab. 2011.
Unconfirmed.
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